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The Doctrine of Double Effect has been described as often used in medicine and surgery but is seldom
described outside the palliative medicine context. This paper presents a possible clinically focussed
illustration of the doctrine of double effect used in an acute urological setting. The authors describe the
case of an elderly patient with signiﬁcant dementia and haematuria who required anticoagulation.
Implicit double effect reasoning may have helped the surgical team reach their initial decision with
regard to a treatment plan, reconciling a duty to beneﬁcence with a duty not to cause harm. This short
case is offered as a stimulus for further discussion over the role of duty-based ethical reasoning in the
acute surgical setting. It also highlights a possible need for more detailed case-analysis in identifying
areas of interest in surgical ethics.
 2009 Surgical Associates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. A case of frank haematuria
A gentleman in his seventies was admitted under the on-call
urology team. The gentleman who also had advanced dementia
(though physically very well) had developed urinary obstruction.
He had been catheterized by his GP. As a result of very poor short
term recall, he had pulled out his catheter. The gentleman was also
on warfarin for a prosthetic heart valve. He developed profuse
haematuria and was referred to the on-call Urology service. He was
initially switched to low molecular weight heparin injections as
a possible replacement for warfarin with a shorter half-life. He
resisted the injections and re-catheterisation violently. He had
previously tolerated his oral medications. After consultation with
the nurses looking after the patient and with the patient’s next-
of-kin, the decision was taken by the on-call surgical team to re-
start the gentleman on warfarin and not to re-catheterise him if he
pulled out his catheter.Papanikitas).
ciates Ltd. Published by Elsevier LtThe rationale for this initial course of action was that his risk of
thromboembolism was greater than the risk posed to the patient’s
health by further bleeding at that time. However, the team recog-
nised that he would foreseeably develop urinary retention and
catherization would give rise to a further bleeding hazard if he
pulled it out again. For the purposes of this discussion we have
concentrated on one aspect of this decision by the on-call surgeons:
the tension between the foreseen and the intended effects of
a clinical decision.
2. Ethics and law
For any moral theory that holds that certain types of intentional
action are always impermissible, difﬁcult practical decisions will
arise where in acting for a legitimate end in pressing circumstances
someone may foresee that they cannot avoid also bringing about
a bad effect of a type that it is impermissible to intend.1
In the healthcare setting it can be hard to beneﬁt a patient
without at the same time causing some harm to the same patient
(and sometimes others as well). What is more, competent clinicians
know these side-effects.2d. All rights reserved.
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as usually embodied in the principle, rule or Doctrine of Double
Effect, has been described as widely applied in medicine3 and
surgery.4 As a recent handbook of General Practice ethics puts it, ‘‘It
is difﬁcult to imagine clinical practice without [this type of
reasoning], particularly at the end of life.5’’ A rigorous philosophical
defence of this principle is a thesis-sized proposition. We will
brieﬂy describe some of the relevant law and ethics here.
The legal principle comes from the 1957 case of R v Adams,6
where a GP was held not to have intended the death of a patient to
whom he prescribed large doses of opiates, provided that there was
a clear intention that these were to treat the patient’s pain. In R v
Adams, the judge said that therewas no special defence for doctors.
However, while discussing palliative treatments7 and terminal
sedation8 respectively, academic lawyers refer to the Adams case as
evidence that, unlike ‘laypeople’, doctors are not presumed to
intend all the consequences of their actions. They ask if doctors use
a deliberately narrow legal deﬁnition of intention, and whether the
principle of double effect in law is evidence of this.9
There is no clear statutory deﬁnition of intention in English law.
Lawyers refer10 to Lord Steyn’s judgement in case of Woollin
[1998]3W. L.R. 382, House of Lords: ‘‘A jury is not entitled to ﬁnd
the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious
bodily harm was a virtual certainty. as a result of defendant’s
actions and the defendant appreciated that this was the case.’’
Woollin threw his infant son against a hard surface and argued
in Court that he did not intend the resulting injuries. It seems
inappropriate to use this case to judge doctors who are trying to
reconcile conﬂicting duties. The principle of double effect is
sometimes seen as an exception to this legal direction, i.e. a legal
and ethical framework which allows people to foresee and tolerate
harm without intending it in a criminal sense.
Medical ethicists demonstrate less of a consensus than the
courts. Some claim that intention is crucial, doctorsmust not intend
to harm their patients,11 but should foresee the lesser of two evils.
Others claim that this is intellectual dishonesty, and that foreseen
outcomes must be intended – one chooses and should be respon-
sible for the lesser of two evils.12
A general criticism of the agonizing over clinical intentions is that
the patient is arguably the best judge of their own best interests. Yet
autonomy, or the patient choosing the contentious course of action,
is not necessarily a defence against liability for doctors who cause
harm as a foreseen side effect. In law consent to a crime by its victim
per se does not constitute a defence for the perpetrator of the crime,
even if the action is to end distress by assisted suicide,13 or to give
pleasure from grievous bodily harm.14 Such principles may be more
applicable to doctors than the one derived from Woollin.
A ‘classic surgical example’ which has been described is the
gynaecologist operating for an ectopic pregnancy to save a wom-
an’s life (which is good), but in order to do so he has to remove the
pregnancy (which – for the sake of argument – is bad).15 Propo-
nents of the principle have argued that the surgeon’s intention is to
save the woman and not to kill the pregnancy, even though the
embryo will certainly die. A variation on this ‘thought experiment’
is the excision of a cancerous but pregnant uterus. The authors
found that a recent and authoritative textbook of surgical ethics
only mentions end-of-life sedation in the context of the principle of
double effect, an example which is arguably not within the remit of
everyday surgical practice.16
3. Can a double effect framework be applied in this acute
admission?
The double effect has been described in the context of treating
bone pain with NSAIDs in a patient at high risk of bleeding.17 Inthe above urological case, however, the therapeutic (anticoagu-
lant) effect of treatment is also the potential cause for the harmful
effect.
Put simply double effect reasoning is a framework permitting
a choice which allows the lesser of two evils in the following
circumstances:
1. The nature of the act is in itself good, or at least morally neutral;
2. The agent intends the good effect only;
3. The agent does not intend the bad effect either as a means to
the good or as an end itself;
4. The good effect outweighs the bad effect in circumstances
sufﬁciently grave to justify risking or causing the bad effect and
the agent exercises due diligence to avoid or minimise the
harm.18
At no point during the case were the words ‘double’ or ‘effect’
used in discussion. This label was applied afterwards when the
initial decision was discussed informally as this was the best ﬁt for
the reasoning involved. In the context of this case:
1. The nature of the act is in itself good: The aim of the admitting
team was to safeguard this gentleman against further dis-
tressing and debilitating illness by continuing his anti-
coagulation and making a decision not to re-catheterise. This
was acknowledged at the time.
2. Signiﬁcant bleeding and the risk of re-obstruction of urinary
outﬂowwere unintended but foreseen. This was acknowledged
at the time.
3. Whereas anticoagulation was intended, the possible conse-
quence (further haematuria or urinary outﬂow obstruction)
was not a means to the good effect, even though the haema-
turia would have resulted from the anticoagulant effect. This
may have been a ‘post hoc’ rationalisation (but see below).
4. The distress which a thromboembolic event such as a stroke
might cause in a patient with severe short termmemory deﬁcit
was seen by the on-call team and patient’s family as the worse
of two evils. Due diligence was taken to monitor and minimise
the effects of bleeding. The decisionwas not regarded ﬁnal. This
was acknowledged at the time.4. Discussion
Many factors may have been relevant to the surgeons’ deci-
sion. The deference of the next-of-kin, whether the patient was
perceived to be in pain, the practicalities and availability of
alternative courses of treatment may all have affected the deci-
sions made and contributed to the ‘moral climate’. Each of these
factors is worthy of separate and extensive discussion (and sadly
beyond the scope of this short paper). The opinion of another
speciality in determining clotting risk (cardiology or haematol-
ogy) would not necessarily have been decisive, and possibly can
even be ambivalent or unhelpful. The notion that surgeons
should only concern themselves with vivisection and leave all
other patient care and decision-making to other specialists is
a separate debate.
The whole question of autonomy in a patient with dementia
may cloud the debate on this case at a pragmatic level. Certainly
where a patient is able to choose from options, or autonomy is
maximised byway of advance directives, proxy consent or methods
to establish what someone with dementia actually wants/would
want, much of the decision-making burden belongs to the patient.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 creates a duty for doctors to maxi-
mize the patient’s liberty even if he does not have capacity to make
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options which are in a patient’s best interests.19
Other ethical approaches may yield the same outcome. For
example: repeated catheterisation and subcutaneous clexane
may represent an extraordinary means of treatment which is
excessively burdensome to the patient. The warfarin was
acceptable to the patient and may have given as something
which as deemed necessary to avoid a worse outcome. The same
course of action might be produced by utilitarian calculation of
risk and beneﬁts of treatments as well as a consideration of
their acceptability to the patient and the effort needed from the
clinical staff. Perhaps the process could be as simple as choosing
the lesser of two evils, if doctors are forgiven for ‘choosing an
evil’. Formulaic responses to complex dilemmas should be
applied with caution. However statutes, case-law and codes of
practice exist to standardise duty and permitted action in any
given society.
Doctors and other healthcare professionals are often asked to
justify decisions which were made in a hurry. This may give rise to
the rationalisation of decisions which were in fact intuitive. There is
no reason why legal, ethical, and moral frameworks previously
encountered by protagonists might not inﬂuence seemingly intui-
tive decisions. Furthermore, discussion of such cases may give rise
to clearer conscious reasoning in future. A way to add valid
(empirical) knowledgemay be to conduct qualitative research, such
as recorded semi-structured interviews with individual members
of a surgical on-call team which is then tested in a focus group
consisting of the same individuals and subjected at both levels to
a rigorous thematic analysis (an approach which has been used to
good effect in mapping ethical approaches to human embryonic
stem cell research and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis).20,21
Another researchmodel invites stakeholders in genetic medicine to
a ‘Genethics club’ where an ethnographic approach is used to
analyse the ‘moral’ as the ‘commonly shared, normalised practices’
and values which structure everyday life, and the ‘ethical’ as
constituted by situations in which, and by the extent to which, the
moral is seen to be problematic, contested, in need of deliberation,
analysis, or critique.22 Perhaps similar approaches towards acute
surgical settings may give academics and policy-makers a closer
look at the ethical coalface.
5. Conclusion
The consensus statement23 on the role of a doctor, supported by
the General Medical Council and the Academy of Medical Royal
Colleges, begins, ‘‘Doctors alone among the healthcare profession
must be capable of regularly taking ultimate responsibility for
difﬁcult decisions in situations of clinical complexity and uncer-
tainty,’’ which is further summarized, ‘‘Doctors must. be capable
of dealing effectively with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity,’’
and, ‘‘Doctors supervise the implementation of care and treatment
plans.’’
Double effect reasoning (whether implicit or explicit) may
have helped the team to reach their initial decision with regard
to a treatment plan, reconciling a duty to do good with a duty
not to cause harm. Nevertheless, the analysis of chosen actions
can be difﬁcult and affords much opportunity for rationalisation
and self-deception.24 The authors recognise that a double effect
analysis is just one of several ways of justifying the course of
action taken, and moreover is one which sits better with
a deontological (duty-based) than a consequentialist moral
framework.
The Doctrine of Double Effect may be often used in medicine
and surgery but is seldom described outside the palliative medicine
context. This paper presents a clinically focussed possibleillustration of the Doctrine of Double Effect used in an acute
urological setting. Our aim is to use this short case and double effect
as a focus for debate surrounding the role of duty-based ethical
reasoning in the acute surgical setting. We acknowledge that in the
space of a short paper it is impossible to do full justice to the social
complexities of the case, the extensive debate and history
surrounding the Doctrine of Double Effect in philosophy, ethics and
law. Though we do not claim to do more than ‘ﬁre a shot’ across
multidisciplinary boundaries, we note the existentialist agonies of
those who carry out research crossing the boundaries of social
science, ethics and other discipline, who see themselves as a ‘Jack of
all trades’ but ‘master of none’.25 Wewould welcome comments on
alternative ethical analyses of and approaches to the study of this
clinical dilemma. We also suggest that empirical study may ground
informal debate in social reality.Conﬂict of interest
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